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Abstract 
  
The contrasting effects of labour market rigidity on efficiency are investigated in a model 
where technological change is non-general purpose and different types of skills are 
available to workers. Ex ante efficiency calls for high labour market rigidity, as this favours 
workers’ acquisition of specific skills which have higher productivity in equilibrium. Ex 
post efficiency calls for low market rigidity, as this allows more workers to transfer to the 
innovating sector of the economy. The trade-off between these two mechanisms results 
in an inverse-U shaped relationship between output and labour market rigidity, which 
implies that a positive level of labour market rigidity is in general beneficial for the 
economy.  
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1 Introduction 
Labour market rigidity has been studied extensively over the last decades in relation 
to the allegedly poor performance of continental Europe labour markets in comparison to 
that of Anglo-Saxon countries. The various aspects that contribute to make a labour 
market rigid have been analysed, generally leading to negative conclusions as to their 
effects1. A strand of this literature has focused on the impact of labour market rigidity on 
labour productivity, reaching similar conclusions. It has been argued that rigidity 
contributes to keep less productive firms in the market, in addition to generating rents for 
employed workers at the expense of the unemployed. A reduction in rigidity will thus 
cause the replacement of less productive firms with more productive ones (Saint-Paul, 
2002). This will boost both average productivity and total output, although the 
consequences for overall employment may be ambiguous. At the industrial level, rigidity 
may slow down the transfer of workers from declining to dynamic sectors of the 
economy by increasing reallocation costs, thus holding up economic growth (Hopenhain 
and Rogerson, 1993). 
Even if some voices have been raised against this general view2, the idea that a 
reduction in labour market rigidities will engender beneficial effects for the economy has 
received widespread support among labour market scholars. However, even a superficial 
look at the reality of the OECD economies shows that this general wisdom is not as 
clear-cut as it may seem. As commented at greater length in section 2, the presence of a 
negative relationship between productivity and labour market rigidity does not seem to 
emerge from the available data. On the contrary, the descriptive evidence shows non-
linearities and countries at medium-high levels of rigidity seemingly outperforming others 
in terms of productivity performance (see section 2: Figure 1). 
The aim of this paper is to build a theoretical model addressing the relationship 
between productivity and labour market rigidity from the angle of technical change and 
incentives in skills acquisition. The focus is on non-general-purpose technical innovations, 
which generate a non-obvious trade-off in workers’ choice between specific vis-à-vis 
general skills. In spite of its extreme simplicity, the model is able to generate non-
linearities in the relationship between productivity and labour market rigidity, which 
makes positive levels of rigidity generally beneficial for the economy’s efficiency.  
The model draws on two basic notions. First, the treatment of the institutional 
features of the labour market is carried out in conjunction with the classic distinction, 
originally put forward by Becker (1964), between specific and general skills. The former 
are skills that may mainly be used by a worker in relation to a specific firm, whereas the 
latter refer to skills that may be transferred across firms. The first mechanism that is 
analysed is that rigid labour markets should foster workers’ incentives to invest in firm-
                                              
1 Some of the aspects that have been analysed are firing costs (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990), the unemployment 
benefit system (Layard et al., 1991), the loss of human capital during unemployment spells (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 
2002), insider-outsiders relations (Blanchard and Summers, 1987), the inability of systems to adjust either to 
macroeconomic shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) or to microeconomic ones (Gottshalk and Moffitt, 1994). 
2 Atkinson (1999) has objected that the rolling back of the welfare state to which the process of liberalization would 
lead may in fact decrease labour markets efficiency. Layard and Nickell (1998) conclude that the empirical evidence 
on the negative impact of labour market rigidity is limited to some institutions, mainly unemployment benefits and 
strong and uncoordinated unions, but is at best weak for the remaining ones. Others have pointed to the social costs 
associated with market liberalization (Rodrik, 1997), and have noted that welfare institutions tend to be larger in 
more open countries, thus underlining their positive function in absorbing macroeconomic shocks (Agell, 1999). 
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specific rather than general human capital, because of the reduced probability of the 
worker being dismissed by a firm. The reason is obviously that workers being made 
redundant will see firm-specific human capital become idle, as that may not be used in 
other firms3. It is clear that, if there was no need for workers to change their jobs over time, the 
situation in which all workers acquired firm-specific skills would maximise total output, as 
by definition these would permit higher productivity at the firm-level than general skills. 
Therefore, one consequence of labour market rigidity is that it should lead to higher firm-
level productivity, and thus to higher output in the economy. 
However, workers do need to change their jobs, mainly in relation to processes of 
technological progress and structural change taking place in the economy. The second 
mechanism that the model takes into account is related to the treatment of technological 
progress. Almost all of the mainstream literature takes technologies to be general purpose 
(GP), that is, applicable to the whole set of techniques currently available (see e.g. Barro, 
1995). General purpose technologies (GPTs) have certainly had a major role in the 
experience of developed economies over the recent years. Information Technologies are a 
typical example of GPT given their wide range of applicability across industries and jobs, 
and the scope of the transformations associated with their implementation is all too clear. 
However, it is also apparent that technological progress has a strong sector-specific and 
firm-specific component (see e.g. Petit and Soete, 2001; Metcalfe, 1998; Pavitt, 1984), 
partly due to the tacit nature of technological knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 
1988; Vivarelli, 1995)4. In spite of the obvious practical relevance of the idea of non-
GPTs, only rarely has this approach been investigated in the theoretical literature, 
exceptions being the seminal work of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), and the model of 
Violante et al. (2002) in their account of wage inequalities within a model of growth. 
Taking into account this idea is crucial in the present model because the uneven 
distribution of non-GPTs innovations across economic sectors call for relevant structural 
adjustments in the allocation of the workforce for efficiency reasons. Output gains for the 
economy may be brought about by reallocating workers from those technologies that 
have failed to innovate into those that have successfully innovated. The distinction 
between general and specific skills is relevant in this respect, because workers having 
acquired general skills should have a greater ability to move across sector thanks to the 
greater transferability of their human capital in comparison with specific skill workers. In 
this case, greater labour market flexibility should facilitate such workforce cross-sector 
adjustments, thus engendering productivity gains for the economy. 
Therefore, a trade-off arises in the model between what are defined ex ante and ex post 
efficiency, where the two concepts of efficiency refer to the time where a non-GP 
innovation occurs. The former requires more workers to acquire specific skills, as this 
boosts firm-specific skills and thus raises overall productivity before a non-GP innovation 
takes place. On the other hand, ex post efficiency calls for more workers to acquire general 
skills, as this enables more workers to move to the innovating sector after a non-GP 
innovation has occurred. Consequently, higher labour market rigidity has a positive 
(negative) effect on ex ante (ex post) efficiency. The resulting relationship between rigidity 
                                              
3 Firms too will have fewer incentives to impart on-the-job training leading to specific human capital in more slack 
labour markets, given the higher probability of losing this investment should the worker leave the firm. This model 
will not take into account the latter aspect, as it will only focus on workers’ incentives. 
4 General purpose (GP) and non-general purpose innovations are likely to be interlinked. The introduction of a GPT 
is likely to generate different paths of technical innovations in different sectors and different firms, thus triggering 
what are in fact non-GP innovations. 
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and total output is thus non-linear, and gives rise to an inverse-U shaped pattern, with ex 
ante (post) efficiency being predominant at low (high) values of rigidity.  
The existing literature has generally considered these two mechanisms only separately, 
thus reaching only partial results. Saint-Paul’s (2002) is a typical example of a model only 
taking into account ex post efficiency. Studies that have analysed the ex ante efficiency link 
are for instance those of Wasmer (2002), who investigates the structural parameters of the 
labour market favouring the acquisition of specific as opposed to general skills, so that 
two different steady states emerge. In his model the acquisition of specific (general) skills 
is favoured by less (more) changeable environments. Belot et al. (2007) use a model with 
non-contractible specific investments, and show that increasing firing costs may raise 
welfare by reducing the likelihood of separation and thus prompting the worker to 
increase her firm-specific effort level. A necessary condition for this to be the case is that 
the worker can appropriate at least part of the surplus increase produced by increased 
effort, so their analysis may not extend to labour markets where this condition does not 
hold. In Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002) a ‘laissez-faire’ and a ‘welfare-state’ economy 
emerge as possible equilibria of their model where the key mechanism is the loss of 
human capital during unemployment spells. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) focus on the 
trade-off between expanding the knowledge of an existing technology versus opting for a 
newer technology. Depending on the degree of transferability of one’s skills towards the 
latest technology, a worker may be locked into an old technology although technologies 
with higher profitability are available in the economy. 
Unlike these approaches, the present model is capable of taking into account both the 
ex ante and ex post efficiency factors in a unified framework, thus offering a more 
comprehensive – and at the same time simple - interpretative model of reality. Moreover, 
it innovates on the existing literature by considering workers’ choice on their skills in 
relation to non-GP innovations. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
presents some descriptive evidence over the relation between productivity and labour 
market rigidity for a sample of OECD economies. Section 3 illustrates the model and puts 
forward the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 studies the impact of a change in labour 
market rigidity on the steady state of the economy, and discusses its effects on 
production. Section 5 concludes and suggests possible extensions of the model
 
2 Some Descriptive Evidence of the Relation Between Productivity and 
Market Rigidity 
The most commonly used indicator of market rigidity is the OECD Employment 
Protection Legislation Index (EPLI), which measures various aspects of the costs that a 
firm has to sustain for workers’ layoffs – both for individual and collective dismissals - as 
well as how easy it is to hire on temporary contracts (OECD, 2004: Chapter 2). Aggregate 
productivity is calculated as GDP per hour of work. Figure 1a-c report some scatterplots 
of the mean productivity levels over three different 5-year spells against the EPLI for a 
sample of OECD economies. These spells are centred around the three years in which the 
EPLI has been issued by the OECD (1990, 1998, 2003).  
Overall, the presence of a negative relation between productivity and market rigidity 
does not seem to receive support from these data. In the 1988-1992 spell, countries 
appear to be clustered around two groups with low and high rigidity, but no significant 
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difference in productivity emerges – and, if anything, this favours countries with higher 
rigidity. In the 1996-2000 spell, the distinction between the two groups become less clear 
– partly because of the new countries entering the sample - and finding a clear-cut 
relationship becomes difficult. Most countries with poor productivity performance have 
relatively high rigidity levels, but at the same time the countries with best productivity 
levels have middle-high levels of rigidity – i.e. Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands. The 
same pattern continues during the 2001-2005 spell, with the performance of the set of 
countries with medium-high rigidity levels even improving with respect to the rest of the 
group in comparison with the previous spell. 
A median spline interpolation of the observations has been added to investigate the 
presence of non-linearities in the relationship. This curve always reaches it maximum in 
correspondence of medium-high levels of rigidity, thus confirming the impression 
gathered above. The peak is particularly pronounced in the most recent spell, whereas a 
decreasing trend in the first portion of the curve – quite notable in the first spell – points 
to the fact that very low rigidity may be more productivity-enhancing than medium-low 
rigidity.  
A basic polynomial econometric model has been run with mean labour productivity 
as dependent variable and the EPLI terms as regressors. Given the paucity of 
observations, this analysis has no purpose of generality, but it serves as a basic check for 
the statistical significance of the patterns observed above. The results are shown in Table 
1. The analysis conducted shows that the model arrested to the cubic term is the best 
within the polynomial class, and is able to explain a substantial amount of the overall 
variance – ranging from 17% for the 1996-2000 spell (Table 1, column 3) to 63% for the 
1988-1992 spell (Table 1: column 1). The coefficients of the linear, quadratic, and cubic 
terms are all significant (Table 1: columns 1, 3, 5). The fact that the signs of the linear and 
the cubic terms are negative, whereas that of the quadratic term is positive, confirms the 
decreasing trend in the medium-low portion of the rigidity scale, which is overturned in 
the medium-high section of the interval. The negative sign of the cubic term highlights 
the bad performance of countries with high levels of rigidity. This model loses some 
significance when the level of GDP is controlled for, but the coefficients remain at least 
weakly significant in all of the three spells (Table 3: columns 2, 4, 6). 
Furthermore, countries that liberalised their labour markets do not seem to have 
improved their performance over time. Figures 2 plots the changes in the labour 
productivity growth rates between subsequent decades against changes in the EPLI. A 
negative value for the EPLI variation means that a country’s labour market became less 
rigid according to the OECD indicator. Countries that liberalised their labour markets in 
the 90’s seem in general to have performed worse than in the previous decade in terms of 
productivity growth rates, and less well than countries that did not liberalise (Figure 2a). 
In particular, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, and Spain all markedly reduced 
their labour market rigidity, but their productivity growth rates dropped in comparison to 
the previous decade. That of Germany marginally increased, whereas Sweden is the only 
case of a clear ‘success’. In the 2000-2005 period, fewer countries liberalised, and on a 
lower scale than in the previous decade. More countries chose to reverse the trend and 
made their labour markets more rigid. Even in this case, the evidence does not support the 
idea that liberalisation helped improve the productivity performance (Figure 2b). 
Although the diagrammatical analysis is at best merely descriptive, and the paucity of 
observations prevent the generalisability of the econometric analysis, the thesis that lower 
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levels of rigidity conduct to better productivity performance does not appear to be 
supported by this evidence. Furthermore, the presence of non-linearities and of a peak in 
the middle-high region of EPLI seems to point to the existence of contrasting forces that 
may affect the relationship between labour market rigidity and productivity growth. 
Although the model developed in the next section is too general to be thought of as 
‘explaining’ these stylised facts, its capacity of generating non-linearities supports the view 
that its underlying mechanisms may indeed be at work in reality. 
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Figure 1a Figure 1b Figure 1c 
 
Figure 1: Labour Productivity and Labour Market Rigidity over Three 5-Year Spells 
 
Sources: Data for productivity are taken from OECD, Statistics Portal. Data for the EPLI are from OECD.stat, v.3.2. Data refer to the Overall EPL, 
version 1. 
Notes: Labour productivity is defined as GDP per hour worked; GDP is Gross Domestic Product expressed in current US Dollars at PPP. Labour input is 
defined as total hours worked of all persons employed. The data are derived as average hours worked from the OECD Employment Outlook, OECD 
Annual National Accounts, OECD Labour Force Statistics and national sources, multiplied by the corresponding and consistent measure of employment 
for each particular country 
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Dependent variables 
Mean Productivity  
(1988-1992) 
Mean Productivity  
(1996-2000) 
Mean Productivity 
(2001-2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EPLI – LINEAR TERM  -6.781 -60.89 -34.556 -6.706 -55.165 -65.05 
 (1.818)*** (8.639)*** (16.159)** (-4.971) (20.474)** (-34.137)* 
EPLI – QUADRATIC TERM 11.538 6.893 23.855 40.238 39.304 45.816 
 (2.895)*** (0.905)*** (11.080)** (-22.995)* (14.846)** (-23.801)* 
EPLI – CUBIC TERM -4.838 -4.178 -11.432 -13.038 -19.454 -22.499 
 (1.158)*** (0.544)*** (5.205)** (-7.179)* (7.345)** (-11.517)* 
GDP  -0.003  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)***  -0.001  -0.001 
Constant 25.904 25.999 27.371 26.961 31.112 30.547 
 (1.726)*** (0.753)*** (2.818)*** (2.887)*** (2.635)*** (2.762)*** 
Observations 19 19 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.63 0.77 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.21 
 
Table 1: Econometric Analysis of the Relation Between Productivity and Labour Market Rigidity 
 
Sources: OECD Stats Portal for GDP. See notes to Table 1 for EPL and Productivity. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10% level ; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% 
level. 
The EPL variables are derived from the EPL index for the year in the middle of the corresponding spell for the dependent 
variable. That is, for the regressions having the mean productivity over the 1988-1992 spell as dependent variable, the EPL 
computed in 1990 has been used to derive the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of the EPLI. Likewise, GDP is measured in 
the same year as the EPLI. 
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Figure 2: Labour Market Liberalization and Changes in Labour Productivity Growth  
 
Sources: See Figure 1 
 
3 The Model 
3.1 General Features 
The model developed basic assumptions are that two different technologies are 
available to produce a certain commodity, and that technological change is not GP. That 
is, innovations occurring for a technology cannot be used to improve the productivity of 
the other. I model technological change by assuming that a technical innovation occurs 
for just one of the two technologies, with even probability for this event to happen. In 
other words, although there is certainty that an innovation will occur, it is a priori 
unknown for which technology the innovation will take place. The model is static and 
thus abstracts away from dynamic economies of scale, which may make innovations more 
or less likely in one of the two sectors depending on the past history of technical progress. 
Technologies are exactly equivalent prior to the occurrence of the innovation.  
Workers of this economy may choose between specific and general skills. Specific skill 
workers are highly specialised in the use of one of the two technologies, but little 
specialised in the other. Conversely, general skill workers do not acquire any technique-
specific specialisation, so that their productivity is, ceteris paribus, the same in the two 
techniques. A crucial assumption made is that specific skill workers have to pay a cost 
before acquiring their technique-specific specialisation. This should be regarded as a 
payment for the training they receive in the use of the technique in which they become 
specialised. In turn, the use of specific skill workers makes a certain technology ceteris 
paribus more productive than when general skill workers are employed. This means that 
total factor productivity is higher when specific skill workers are employed. Since it is 
assumed that returns to scale are decreasing in labour, the same may not necessarily be 
true for marginal productivity. However, as will be demonstrated, the entry cost for 
specialised workers makes their average wage higher than that of general skill workers in 
equilibrium. This creates a gap in the marginal productivity of specific and general skill 
labour that advantages the former. As a result, the marginal productivity of specific skilled 
labour will in general be higher than that of general skill workers. 
Specific skill workers may be seen as the workers ‘elite’, in that they receive more 
years of training – or a more intensive educational activity - and are thus better able to 
boost production in a certain sector. However, a general skill worker is able to transfer 
her skills across the two technologies more easily than a specific skill worker. For 
simplicity, I assume that specific skill workers may only be employed in one technology, 
whereas general skill workers may migrate across the two technologies, up to a transfer 
cost. Another way to look at this assumption is to think that a specific skill worker 
executes a specific investment in the firm at which she is hired, which makes it 
economically unprofitable to switch to the alternative technology. Workers have to 
choose in which technological sector to locate prior to receiving their training. Being the 
individual probability of innovation equal to ½, agents are indifferent as to which 
technological sector to choose, so that they will distribute equally across the two sectors. 
In this version of the model, it is assumed that managers may not move across sectors. 
The timing of the model is described in Figure 3. First, agents decide which 
technological sector to enter. For the law of large numbers workers will distribute evenly 
across the two sectors. They then decide whether to acquire technology-specific or 
general skills. Their type of skill remains fixed thereafter. Once such a choice has been 
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made, a worker joins a firm. Subsequently, workers observe in which technique the 
innovation has occurred, and general skill workers may decide to migrate towards the 
alternative sector upon the payment of a transfer cost. At this point, production occurs 
and wages are paid according to workers’ marginal productivity. 
Workers 
choose in 
which of the 
two sectors 
to locate. 
Workers 
choose which 
type of skill to 
adopt. 
Workers are 
assigned to a 
firm. 
An innovation 
occurs in one 
of the two 
technologies. 
Some general 
skill workers 
swap sector. 
Production 
takes place and 
workers are 
paid their 
wages. 
 
Figure 3: Timing of the Model 
 
We consider the transfer costs that specific skill workers have to sustain to move 
across sectors as a measure of labour market rigidity. In other words, rigidity is seen in 
this model as hampering workers’ capacity to leave a firm to move to another one. 
Admittedly, this way of modelling rigidity is fairly general and does not capture all of the 
more fine-grained aspects associated with labour market rigidity. Even so, we believe that 
the model captures the most important characteristics of rigidity and that the results we 
obtain are robust to more detailed specifications. 
3.2 Basic Setting 
We proceed backwards to illustrate the formal specification of the model. The 
superscripts S, G denote whether agents have acquired a specific or a general type of skill, 
respectively. The subscript I, N and M denote the sectors where workers are located. In 
particular, I stands for innovating sector, N for non-innovating sector, and M 
characterises those workers with general skills who migrate from the non-innovating to 
the innovating sector.  
First, let us deal with the innovating sectors. Managers who are active in this sector 
maximise the following profit function: 
 ( )GMGIGISISIGISII llwlwYY +−−+=π       ( 1 ) 
 
where the production functions have a Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
( )( )αγ SISSI lAY += 1         ( 2 ) 
( )( )αγ GMGIGGI llAY ++= 1        ( 3 ) 
 
and where the following set of restrictions apply: 
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Managers can employ both specific and general skill workers, whose respective 
contributions to production are additively separable. In particular, it has to be noted that 
the general skill labour input comprises both workers who were already located in this 
sector and those who migrate after the innovation takes place. Different wage rates are 
paid to specific and general skill workers on the basis of their marginal productivity, but 
the same wage rate is paid to the two categories of general skill workers. Furthermore, 
output has decreasing returns to scale in labour in both the specific and the general labour 
input. The ‘scarce’ factor in the production function is assumed to be managerial 
competences, as for instance in Rigolini (2004) and Mookherjee and Ray (2003). Specific 
skill workers are characterised as being more effective in using a certain technology. This 
is reflected in the fact that total factor productivity of the relative production function is 
higher than the other (AS>AG).  γ represents the productivity bonus brought about by the 
innovation. Although specific skill workers may be thought of as being better able to 
exploit the benefits of an innovation, for simplicity it is assumed that both categories of 
workers are equally able to reap the innovation bonus. Hence, the productivity bonus is 
the same in the two sectors. 
Maximisation of the profit function with respect to either labour input yields the 
following optimality conditions: 
 
( )( ) 11 −+= αγα SISSI lAw        ( 5 ) 
( )( ) 11 −++= αγα MIGIGGI llAw        ( 6 ) 
 
Additionally, it is assumed that the transfer costs for general skill workers moving from 
the non-innovating to the innovating sector equal a proportion cT of their wage. Their net 
wage is then equal to:  
 
( TGIGM cww −= 1 )
                                             
         ( 7 ) 
 
Tc is a key parameter of the model because it identifies the economy’s level of market 
rigidity. The main idea is that economies with higher (lower) labour market rigidity will be 
characterised by higher (lower) transfer costs for workers wanting to leave a firm and join 
another one. Such costs may be thought of as a penalty that a general skill worker has to 
pay to her former firm in the non-innovating sector – or to the government - in order to 
leave that firm and move to a firm in the innovating sector5. Although transfer costs may 
include a variety of costs not directly controlled by a policy-maker - such as costs for 
geographical relocations, fixed legal costs, etc - cT will be thought of as a variable of 
 
5 It might appear counter-intuitive that market rigidity engenders a cost for a worker, rather than representing a form 
of protection. However, this characteristic of the model may be easily made more realistic by modelling explicitly 
managers’ choices, and assuming that the transfer cost was paid by the firm rather than by the worker. Even in this 
case, transfer costs would hinder workers’ cross-sector transferability and would reduce the possibility of being re-
employed in the innovating sector of the economy. Hence, the same results would be obtained as in the present 
form of the model. 
 13
economic policy, so that it is possible to link explicitly its value to different institutional 
settings. 
Let us now consider the sector that does not innovate. Managers who are active 
therein will maximise the following profit function: 
 
G
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S
NN lwlwYY −−+=π        ( 8 ) ( )αSNSSN lAY =          ( 9 ) ( )αGNGGN lAY =          ( 10 ) 
 
This is identical to (1) through (3) above but for the absence of the productivity bonus 
associated with the innovation.  is the number of general skill workers who do not 
migrate to the innovating sector. Optimal employment of labour yields the following 
conditions: 
G
Nl
 
( ) 1−= αα SNSSN lAw         ( 11 ) ( ) 1−= αα GNGGN lAw         ( 12 ) 
3.3 The Equilibrium Conditions  
Since managers are assumed not to be able to move across sectors, the equilibrium 
conditions only concern workers’ decisions. Overall we have five different categories of 
workers: specific and general skill workers active in either the innovating or in the non-
innovating sector, and general skill workers migrating to the innovating sectors. Five 
conditions are thus needed to determine labour sectoral allocation and the choice of skills. 
Equations (5) – (7) and (11)-(12) above set wages accordingly.  
Firstly, conditions (13) and (14) are direct consequences of the way the model has 
been constructed:  
 
S
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S
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G
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Each condition requires the distribution of workers across the two technological sectors 
to be even. The reason is that workers have to choose a sector before the innovation 
occurs, and each sector looks equally profitable to both specific and general skill workers. 
Condition (15) requires the number of workers employed be equal to the total supply of 
labour L.  
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Full employment is assumed, so that (15) is always satisfied. Condition (16) requires 
general skill workers who are located in the non-innovating sector to be indifferent 
between migrating to the alternative sector and remaining in the current sector:  
 
G
N
G
M ww =          ( 16 ) 
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Were  greater than , then more general skill workers would have an incentive to 
move to the innovating sector. Were the opposite true, some workers who had migrated 
to the innovating sector would in fact be better off in the non-innovating sector.  
G
Mw
G
Nw
The final condition concerns which type of skill to acquire. A specific skill worker has 
a probability equal to ½ of earning a wage in either the innovating or in the non-
innovating sector, so that her expected wage, denoted with Sw~ , amounts to:  
 
( )( SSNSIS cwww −+= 121~ )         ( 17 ) 
 
Sc  is the training cost that specific skill workers have to pay in order to acquire their 
specialisation. It is assumed to be a portion of the expected wage that will be earned once 
employed. Similarly, a general skill worker’s average wage is equal to:  
 
( GNGIG www += 21~ )        ( 18 ) 
 
(18) makes use of condition (16) above in that a worker who is originally located in the 
non-innovating sector earns the same wage whether she moves to the alternative sector or 
remains in the non-innovating sector. Moreover, it is assumed that no additional cost is 
required to acquire this type of skill, unlike specific skill workers.  
Condition (19) requires the expected wage of specific and non-specific skill workers 
to be equal to one another: 
 
GS ww ~~ =          ( 19 ) 
 
A steady state of the system is defined as the set of wage rates and labour allocations that 
satisfies the system of 10 equations given by (5) – (7), (11)-(16) and (19). 
3.4 Efficiency and First Best 
The normative criterion that will be deployed for the analysis of efficiency is 
unconstrained maximisation of expected output. Unlike Saint-Paul (2002), the focus of 
this paper is not on the political economy aspects of labour market institutions. Hence, 
notions such as Pareto-efficiency – which would require the various labour categories to 
benefit from institutional changes - are not desirable. Moreover, given the relatively high 
number of categories, Pareto-efficiency may be too weak a concept to discriminate among 
allocations. 
Output maximisation is unconstrained because both transfer costs and skill upgrade 
costs are assumed to be revenues for some other agents who are part of the economic 
system, whose welfare is worth taking into account by the policy-maker. Consequently, 
the relative costs and benefits cancel out in the policy-maker’s objective function. For 
instance, the costs for the acquisition of specific skills may be thought of as being paid to 
some other specific skill worker or to the manager of the firm through on-the-job 
training. Cross-sector transfer costs are considered as instruments of economic policy, 
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alike fiscal revenues for the government, which are redistributed in some forms to the 
agents after their collection. The maximisation is on ‘expected’ output because it is 
assumed that the policy-maker is subject to the same informational constraints outlined in 
section 3.2. That is, she knows that an innovation will occur with equal probability in one 
of the two sectors of the economy, but she cannot know ex ante in which sector the 
innovation will occur. This implies that conditions (13), (14), and (15), relative to the ex 
ante allocation of labour across sector, will act as constraints for the policy-maker’s 
maximisation problem. The equilibrium conditions (16) and (19) relative to workers’ 
incentives to move across sectors do not instead act as constraints, as an increase in total 
output may derive from the violation of these conditions. 
More formally, once the three constraints (13), (14), (15) are substituted into the 
policy-maker’s objective function, it looks as follows: 
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The two first-order conditions yield: 
 ( ) GNGNGNGMGIGIGI MPlYllYMP ≡∂∂=+∂∂≡      ( 21 ) ( ) GNGIGNGNGMGIGISNSNSISISNSI MPMPlYllYlYlYMPMP +≡∂∂++∂∂=∂∂+∂∂≡+  ( 22 ) 
 
Condition (21) refers to what has been defined as ex post efficiency. It prescribes that 
marginal productivity be the same in the two sectors employing general skills. Since non-
GP innovations increase total factor productivity in the innovating sector but not in the 
non-innovating one, optimal allocation of labour requires the shift of some workers 
towards the latter until marginal productivity is equalised. The term ex post emphasises 
that the achievement of this target requires an adjustment of workers after the innovation 
has occurred. 
Condition (22) refers to what has been called ex ante efficiency. Given the 
impossibility for a specific skill worker to move across sectors, a condition analogous to 
(21) cannot hold in this case. What (22) prescribes instead is that the loss of output from 
the transfer of a worker from the general skill sector to the specific skill sector should be 
compensated by an increase in output of the same magnitude in the latter sector. That is, 
the allocation of workers across the two sectors must be optimal before the innovation 
occurs, so that no reallocation of workers may increase total output. 
The solution to the maximisation defines the first best solution for this economy. The 
presence of both labour market rigidity and training costs to acquire specific skills 
introduce a gap between marginal productivity in those sectors, thus leading to a violation 
of these conditions. Figure 4 reports the optimal level of output in relation to such costs, 
and shows how they determine a departure from the first best, which is located at the 
origin of the axes. The terms ex post and ex ante inefficiencies – or output losses - will be 
used to denote departures from such first best. It is worth stressing that the transfer costs 
 are taken to be structural parameters of the model and thus outside the control of 
policy-makers, whereas transfer costs are the variable subject of economy policy. 
Therefore, in most of the remainder of the paper, the notions of efficiency will be treated 
Sc
Tc
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in relation to a given value of , and it will be analysed how changes in bring about 
variations in efficiency. 
Sc Tc
 
Figure 4: Optimal Output as a Function of Transfer and Training Costs 
 
4 The Impact of an Increase in Labour Market Rigidity 
4.1 An Overview 
As illustrated in section 3, labour market rigidity is modelled as the transfer costs cT 
with which general skill workers are faced when changing their occupations. As will be 
demonstrated in the next sections, there are two ways in which cT affects total output, 
which are associated with the ex ante and the ex post stages described in section 3.4. As for 
the former, an increase in cT will make more attractive for workers to acquire specific skills. 
The reason is that the higher cT, the lower the expected wage for general skill workers 
because of their reduced cross-sector transferability. Consequently, more workers will be 
employed in the specific skill sectors of production in the economy, which will increase 
total output given the higher average marginal productivity in that sector. Second, an 
increase in cT  will ex post curtail the possibility for general skill workers to move towards 
the innovating sector. As a result, fewer workers will be able to move to the sector of the 
economy where the technology is more efficient, thus reducing output. Therefore, an 
increase in cT has at the same time a positive effect on output in that it makes ex ante more 
convenient for workers to acquire specific skills, but has a negative effect in that it hinders 
the possibility for general skill workers to migrate to the more efficient sector of the 
economy ex post. The next sections will investigate under which conditions the ex ante 
effect prevails over the ex post one. The analytical solution for the steady state and the 
proofs are reported in the Appendix. 
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4.2 Effects on General Skill Labour Allocation 
The first relevant result concerns the mobility of general skill workers across sectors: 
 
Lemma 1: As cT increases, there will be fewer general skill workers able to transfer from the non-
innovating to the innovating sector: 
TTT
G
M cccl <∀<∂∂      0  
 
The value of Tc is given in (31). It represents the greatest value that transfer costs can 
assume for an internal solution of the steady state. In fact, as shown in the Appendix, for 
values of above Tc Tc , a corner solution obtains where no general skill worker wishes to 
transfer to the innovating sector. The reason is that transfer costs are then too high in 
comparison to the productivity premium to make transfer from the non-innovating to the 
innovating sector profitable. Hence, the study of the model is restricted to values of 
below Tc Tc . What Lemma 1 implies is hardly surprising. The higher the transfer costs, 
the fewer the general skill workers who are able to transfer to the innovating sector.  
Lemma 2 concerns general skill workers active in the innovating sector: 
 
Lemma 2: There exists an internal minimum in the steady state ex ante allocation of general skill 
labour in the innovating sector with respect to the transfer costs. In particular, is increasing (decreasing) 
in c
G
Il
T for values greater (smaller) than a threshold . Such a minimum is unique:  Tcˆ
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G
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The expression for Tc  is given in (33). The fact that the ex ante allocation of general skill 
worker decreases below the threshold T  is not surprising. In fact, the higher the transfer 
costs, the lower the expected wage for general skill workers, and thus the fewer the 
workers who acquire this type of skill ex ante. The existence of a threshold beyond which 
the pattern of labour allocation changes is perhaps more surprising. This is due to the 
wage dynamics and to the shape of the production function, and will be further 
commented in section 4.3.  
ˆ
cˆ
 
Lemma 3: As cT increases, the amount of general skill workers active in the innovating sector will 
decrease: ( ) TTTGMGI cccll <∀<∂+∂      0  
 
Both  and  decrease for . For values of  above the threshold, instead, the fact 
that starts growing is offset by the decrease in . Overall, then, general skill labour in 
the innovating sector decreases as transfer costs rise. This result leads directly to: 
G
Il
G
Ml TT cc ˆ< Tc
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Corollary 1: As cT increases, production by general skill workers active in the innovating sector will 
decrease: 
TTT
G
I cccY <∀<∂∂      0  
 
This result is now to be contrasted with what occurs in the non-innovating sector for 
general skill workers: 
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Lemma 4: As cT increases, the amount of general skill workers active in the non-innovating sector will 
increase: 
TTT
G
N cccl <∀>∂∂      0  
 
The fact that more workers are unable to transfer to the innovating sector as T  increases 
causes general skill labour to be rising in . Hence, as far as  is concerned, this effect 
must compensate the ex ante disincentive to acquire general skills due to increased transfer 
costs. Consequently: 
c
Tc
G
Nl
 
Corollary 2: As cT increases, production by general skill workers active in the non-innovating sector will 
increase: 
TTT
G
N cccY <∀>∂∂      0  
 
The impact of T on overall production by general skill workers is therefore ambiguous. 
Lemma 5 states that the impact is in fact negative throughout the relevant interval.  
c
 
Lemma 5: As cT increases, overall production by general skill workers will decrease: 
TTT
G cccY <∀<∂∂      0  
where: 
G
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Lemma 5 shows that higher transfer costs hinder general skill workers mobility from the 
less productive to the more productive sector of the economy. As a result, production 
from general skill workers decreases. This result reflects ex post efficiency (see section 3.4). 
The increase in transfer costs hampers the possibility of transferring labour inputs of the 
general type towards the more efficient sector of the economy, so that condition (21) of 
equality of marginal productivity is violated. In this sense, higher labour market rigidity is 
detrimental to the economy in that it prevents adjustment to sectors with higher 
productivity. This idea may be restated more formally in Lemma 6:  
 
Lemma 6: The only ex post efficient allocation of labour inputs is for cT=0. The higher cT, the 
more ex post--inefficient the allocation is. 
4.3 Effects on Specific Skill Labour Allocation 
The implications described in Lemma 5 and 6 above are to be contrasted with the 
following results for specific skill workers: 
 
Lemma 7: There exists an internal maximum in the steady state allocation of labour in the specific 
skill sector with respect to transfer costs. In particular, specific skill labour is increasing (decreasing) in cT 
for values smaller (greater) than the same threshold  as in Lemma 2. Such a maximum is unique. 
That is,  
Tcˆ
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This result is symmetrical to what found in Lemma 2. As Tc  increases, more workers will 
prefer to choose the specific type of skill, as the expectation of higher mobility costs in 
the alternative type of skill will hinder mobility and thus decrease the expected wage were 
they to acquire general skills. However, for values of  above the threshold , this 
pattern is reversed. The latter result is linked to the wage dynamics for general skill 
workers. Lemma 1 states that, as c
Tc Tcˆ
T rises, fewer workers will be able to move from the 
non-innovating towards the innovating sector of the economy. This has two opposite 
effects on wages earned by general skill workers. On the one hand, it will increase the 
wages of workers active in the innovating sector, because, as Lemma 2 shows, the overall 
number of workers who are active in that sector will drop. On the other hand, for 
symmetrical reasons, it will also decrease the wages of workers active in the non-
innovating sector. However, these two effects are not equal in size, and expected general 
skill wages present a U-shaped pattern with respect to cT. In particular, for values of cT 
below (above) Tc , the latter (former) between these two effects dominates, so that 
expected wages for general skill workers will decrease (increase). As a result, the number 
of workers acquiring specific skills will be decreasing (increasing) in the region when c
ˆ
T 
exceeds (is below) the threshold c . T
Lemma 7 leads to the following 
ˆ
 
Corollary 3: There exists an internal maximum in the steady state production from specific skill 
workers with respect to transfer costs. In particular, production from specific skill labour is increasing 
(decreasing) in cT for values smaller (greater) than the threshold . Moreover, such a maximum is unique. 
That is,  
Tcˆ
TTTTT
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Corollary 3 underpins the ex ante efficiency argument set out above. It states that higher 
transfer costs have, for values of cT below the threshold T , a positive impact on 
production from specific skill workers. The reason is that higher transfer costs imply a 
decline in the expected general skill wage, so that more workers will find it optimal to 
acquire specific skills. Lemma 8 restates this argument in terms of efficiency: 
cˆ
 
Lemma 8: The only ex ante-efficient allocation of labour inputs is for cT= . The closer the 
economy to this value, the more ex ante--efficient the allocation is. 
Tcˆ
4.4 Overall Effects 
We have seen how ex ante efficiency prescribes to allocate more resources to specific 
skills (Lemma 8), whereas ex post efficiency calls for increasing the share of general skill 
workers (Lemma 6), which makes it possible a better use of technical innovations. Lemma 
9 states a general result on these two effects.  
Lemma 9: Suppose  is positive. Then, there exists a maximum in the region  where total 
output as a function of is maximised:  
Sc ( ]Tcˆ,0
Tc
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Lemma 9 thus claims that an economic system will maximise its output when labour 
market rigidity is set at some positive levels. 
4.5 Discussion 
The underlying reason for the result in Lemma 9 lies in the distortions brought about 
by the training costs . This represents an entry cost in the labour market for specific 
skill workers, which is compensated by a rent in terms of higher average wages after their 
entry. Only under the expectation of a higher average wage would workers take up 
specific-skills in the first place. Another way to look at this aspect of the model, is to 
consider higher average specific-skill wages as the cost that firms are available to pay to 
their specific skill workers in exchange of their higher productivity.  
Sc
The presence of a rent inevitably brings about some form of inefficiency in the 
economy. In the present model, this is given by the reduction in the number of specific 
skill workers with respect to the first best (see section 3.4). This is necessary in order for 
their average wage to rise above the first best level, but causes average marginal 
productivity of specific skill workers to be higher than that of generic skill workers. This 
entails an output loss with respect to the first best, which every increase in the number of 
specific skill workers helps to alleviate. In other words, the more specific skill workers, 
the lower their wage and thus their rent, thus reducing the inefficiency in the economy. 
An increase in T is thereby efficiency-enhancing because it rises the incentives for 
workers to invest in specific skills, thus reducing their rent. This is nothing but a 
restatement of the ex ante efficiency argument (see section 3.4). 
c
Nonetheless, in the present model an increase in also curbs the possibility of 
general skill workers to transfer to the innovating sector of the economy. This represents 
the ex post form of inefficiency. Lemma 9 determines the value of that trades off 
optimally ex ante against ex post efficiency, and it ensures that such a value lies in the 
interior of the feasible range for . For every value of the transfer costs, a further rise in 
 brings about both an output loss due to the lower mobility of general skill workers 
after the innovation, and an output gain associated with more workers learning specific 
skills and thus reducing the rent prior to the innovation. Lemma 9 states that at these 
two costs are exactly equal to each other, and thus it represents the optimal solution for 
the economy given . Therefore, some positive levels of labour market rigidity lead to 
higher efficiency in the economy.  
Tc
Tc
Tc
Tc
 *Tc
Sc
The reason why ex ante efficiency prevails over ex post efficiency at relatively low 
values of  depends on the nature of the distortions associated the two forms of 
efficiency. By definition, the output losses associated with ex post inefficiency equal zero 
when  is equal to zero, and then monotonically increase with . Conversely, the 
output losses brought about by ex ante inefficiency are strictly positive when  is equal to 
zero, the reason being that this form of inefficiency is originated by the training costs . 
So, provided that training costs are positive, ex ante inefficiency will be positive even when   
Tc
Tc Tc
Tc
Sc
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Tc  is equal to zero, and then progressively diminishes as increases. Figure 5 plots a 
typical pattern of the output losses associated with ex ante and ex post inefficiency. 
Tc
 
Ex Post 
inefficiency loss: 
 G
N
G
I MPMP −  
Ex Ante 
inefficiency loss: 
 ( ) ( )GNGISNSI MPMPMPMP +−+   
Figure 5: Ex Post and Ex Ante Inefficiency Losses 
Notes: The diagram has been obtained for the following set of parameters: { }100 ;2.0 ;3 ;1 ;3 ;5.0 ====== LcAA SGS γα  
 
Figure 6 plots the economy’s overall output against for various levels of . It 
shows that the maximum is located in the origin when equals zero, and that this shifts 
rightwards as increases. Moreover, the absolute level of the maximum decreases as  
increases, because the distortion in ex ante efficiency increases. Table 2 reports the 
numerical values for the maximum and maximand of total output for different values of 
. 
Tc Sc
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        CS = 0 
           CS=0.1 
          CS=0.2 
        CS=0.3 
        CS=0.4 
Figure 6: Optimal Output as a Function of Labour Market Rigidity 
Notes: See note to Figure 5 
 
Values for 
 Sc
Optimal value of 
 Tc
Optimal Value 
of Output 
0 0 81.85 
0.05 0.08 81.85 
0.1 0.15 81.82 
0.15 0.21 81.77 
0.2 0.27 81.67 
0.25 0.31 81.54 
0.3 0.35 81.32 
0.35 0.38 81.01 
0.40 0.41 80.55 
 
Table 2: Optimal Output and Optimal Value of Labour Market Rigidity as a Function of 
Training Costs 
Notes: See note to Figure 5 
 
Figure 7 shows that not only have positive levels of transfer costs an output-
enhancing effect, but the same may be true for the training costs. An interior solution for 
 in the problem of output maximisation given a certain value of , is the case for values of 
 in the region above 0.3. In this region ex ante efficiency losses are at its lowest (see 
Figure 5), so an increase in increases the number of general skill workers and reduces ex 
post efficiency losses. Therefore, even in this case augmenting costs may be beneficial for 
an economy. 
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Figure 7: Optimal Value of Output as a Function of Training Costs 
Notes: See note to Figure 5 
5 Conclusions 
The paper has developed a simple model where two contrasting effects of rigidity in 
the labour market may be analysed. Ex post efficiency calls for low market rigidity, as this 
permits workers having acquired general skills to transfer to the innovating sector of the 
economy. Ex ante efficiency requires high labour market rigidity, as this encourages 
workers to acquire specific skills, which increases output in equilibrium. This is crucially 
due to the presence of a rent accruing to specific skill workers for the cost they have to 
sustain for their skill acquisition. The interaction between these two effects leads to an 
inverse-U relation between labour market rigidity and output, which implies that some 
degrees of labour market rigidity are indeed beneficial for the economy.  
The model contradicts the argument that removing market rigidities will necessarily 
increase output by boosting productivity. When technical change is non-GP and factors 
of production are scarce – so that in particular the production function has decreasing 
returns to scale in labour -, removing market rigidity will lower the incentives for workers 
to acquire specific productivity-enhancing skills. The loss in output associated with this 
effect cannot be compensated by the fact that with less rigidity workers may shift towards 
the innovating sector of the economy. This argument may be at the basis of the observed 
non-linear relationship between labour productivity growth rates and degrees of 
employment protection highlighted in Section 2. 
The model lends itself to several generalisations. Firstly, the introduction of a 
dynamic perspective, that is, the replication of production over an arbitrarily long 
horizon, would permit the analysis of the ‘turbulence’ of the economic environment. This 
would permit us to take into account the role of skills as an insurance against variability in 
 24
the environment. Since it is generally thought that general skills are better protected 
against fast technical change than specific skills, then the trade off between ex ante and ex 
post efficiency may result in a different outcome than what obtained in the present model. 
Moreover, the results presented in this paper have been derived for a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Their robustness to changes in the shape of the production function 
would then need to be verified.  
In spite of these remarks, the present model seems to offer a suitable framework to 
investigate the trade-offs between different mechanisms affecting the labour market in a 
context of non-general purpose technical change and multiplicity of skills.  
6 Appendix 
The solution of the system of equations leads to the following steady state 
expressions for labour allocations across sectors and skills: 
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D1 depends positively on the incentives to migrate towards the innovating sector for 
general skill workers in the ex post stage. D2, instead, weighs the incentives to acquire 
specific skills vis-à-vis general ones in the ex ante phase. As a result, a higher value of D1 
relative to D2 favours allocation of labour to the general skills. A condition must be 
imposed on D1 to ensure that  does not enter the negative region. That is, DGMl 1 has to be 
non-negative, which leads to: 
 
γγ +≡≤ 1TT cc         ( 31 ) 
 
We assume that such a condition is always satisfied, so that the system is studied over the 
range [ TT cc ,0∈ ]. The above condition requires the productivity gain in the innovating 
sector be sufficiently high in comparison to the transfer costs.  
D2 is non-negative across the relevant range of parameters. I also define 
  
 25
( )( )[ ] αγ −−+= 1 13 11 TcD        ( 32 ) 
 
so that { 1
2
1
31 −= DD }. As a result of the above restriction, the parameters have to satisfy 
the following inequalities for [ ]TT cc ,0∈ : 
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Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiating  with respect to cGMl T leads to: 
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Given the above restrictions on the parameters, this expression is always negative over 
the interval [ Tc,0 ]. QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 2
Differentiating  with respect to cGIl T leads to: 
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Given the restrictions imposed on the parameters, it is immediate to verify that this 
expression is negative for  and positive for 0=Tc TT cc = . Moreover, there exists only a 
value in which the differential is equal to 0, that is: 
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Such a value lies in the interior of the interval [ ]Tc,0 . 
 
Proof of Lemma 3
Differentiating  with respect to cGMGI ll + T leads to: 
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Given the above restrictions on the parameters, this expression is always negative over 
the interval [ Tc,0 ]. QED 
 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 4
Differentiating  with respect to cGNl T leads to: 
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Given the above restrictions on the parameters, this expression is always positive over the 
interval [ Tc,0 ]. QED 
 
Proof of Lemma 5 
By applying the chain rule, one obtains: 
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After recalling the expressions for production, steady state labour allocation and the 
results from Lemma 3, and after simplifying, one obtains: 
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This expression is negative over the interval [ ]Tc,0 .  
Similarly, one has: 
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After substituting the relevant expressions from Lemma 4, and after some simplifications, 
the following expression obtains: 
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This is a positive expression over the relevant interval.  
After summing up the two derivatives, we obtain: 
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After some tedious algebra, the expression in brackets can be simplified so as to yield: 
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Proof of Lemma 6 
From the wage-setting rules (6), (7), (12), and from the equilibrium condition (16), one 
can derive the following inequality: 
 
0>=− TGIGNGI cwMPMP        ( 34 ) 
where and  are defined in (20).  GIMP GNMP
Since ex post efficiency is associated with marginal productivity being equal in the 
innovating and non-innovating general skill production, it is apparent from (34) that the 
only allocation where this occurs is for 0=Tc . 
 
Proof of Lemma 7 
 
Differentiating  with respect to cSIl T leads to: 
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 QED. 
 
Proof of Lemma 8: 
 
From the equilibrium condition (19), and considering the wage-setting rules (5), (6), (7), 
(11), (12), one derives the following inequality: 
 ( ) 0>+=− SNSISGS wwcMPMP       ( 35 ) 
where  
SSS lYMP ∂∂=         ( 36 ) 
GGG lYMP ∂∂=         ( 37 ) 
S
N
S
I
S lll +=          ( 38 ) 
G
N
G
M
G
I
G llll ++=         ( 39 ) 
 
Given the negative relation between wages and labour, the right-hand side of (34) is 
minimized when reaches its maximum, that is, according to Lemma 7, when . 
Hence, ex ante efficiency is maximised for 
Sl TT cc ˆ=
TT cc ˆ= , and efficiency gains may be obtained 
by moving closer to this value.  
 
Proof of Lemma 9 
Suppose  is strictly positive. By applying the chain rule, we have: Sc
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where . Hence, one has to compare the size of this derivative with that 
determined above for 
S
N
S
I
S YYY +=
GY . After some algebra, this expression reads as follows: 
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After some simplifications, we conclude that the expression in brackets is positive for 
: 0=Tc
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Moreover, on the grounds of Lemma 5 and Corollary 3, we may observe that derivatives 
are negative for values of  above :  Tc Tcˆ
 
{ } 0sgn
ˆ
<∂∂+∂∂ ≥ TT ccT
G
T
S cYcY  
 
Hence, given the continuity of SY  for [ ]TT cc ,0∈ , we can conclude that there exists a 
value of  internal to the interval Tc [ ]Tc,0  where the derivative of Y with respect to  
equals 0. QED
Tc
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